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ABSTRACT 
It is sometimes the case that the value of a resource 
at one stage of production must be assessed in the absence of a 
well defined market at that stage. One tool for valuation is the 
"workback" method, which imputes a value to a resource at an early 
processing stage by subtracting from an observed price for the 
resource at a more refined stage all of the costs incurred between 
the two stages. The workback method has been used by the courts in 
attempting to assess the wellhead value of helium extracted from 
helium-bearing natural gas streams during the Helium Conservation 
Program. This paper describes conditions necessary for a correct 
application of the workback method generally, and then provides an 
economic analysis of two court decisions using the workback method 
in the helium industry. Most importantly, the paper shows why a 
correct application of the workback method requires an understanding 
of market structure, whether the method is applied to helium, other 
natural resources, or more general multistage production processes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the period of 1962-1973, the federal government 
purchased and stored large amounts of helium under a helium 
conservation program. The value of the helium produced at the 
wellhead has been the focus of a number of recent court cases. The 
issue of valuation would have been straightforward if the courts 
had agreed that helium produced at the wellhead had been sold into 
a competitive market, in which case the market price would represent 
the value of helium. In 1974 a district court in Kansas decided that 
there was sufficient competition at the wellhead to use the market 
price, and that the value was approximately $0. 60 to $0. 70 per Mcf 
(thousand standard cubic feet). 1 
However, a similar case tried in the Northern District 
Court of Oklahoma in 1973 led to a markedly different conclusion. 
The court concluded that the various sales of helium at the 
wellhead were sufficiently different in time and place so that no 
single contract price could be used to represent the value of 
helium. 2 The court then calculated the value of helium using the 
"workback method, " which imputed a value to helium at the wellhead 
by subtracting from an observed price for helium at a processed 
stage all of the costs incurred during processing. There were 
two major points that had to be resolved by the court: (1) which 
market for processed helium should serve as a starting point for 
the workback method, and (2) what costs of processing should be 
subtracted to obtain a "proper" value at the wellhead. The particular 
2 
application of the workback method chosen by the court led to a 
wellhead value calculated to be somewhere between $11 and $17 per 
Mcf. 
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, which consolidated the two cases. By 1977 the 
appeals court had taken no action on the decision of the Kansas 
district court. In May 1977 it affirmed the decision of the 
Oklahoma court with respect to the use of the workback method, but 
remanded the case for further consideration of the proper starting 
value from which workback calculations would be made, the costs of 
processing, and more generally, other issues pertinent to the use 
3 . of the workback method. Thus, in August 1978, the case was heard 
again in the same Oklahoma district court that had issued the ruling 
in 1973 that helium at the wellhead was worth between $11 and $17 per 
Mcf. 
The author appeared as an expert witness for the government 
in that trial, for the purpose of showing how the workback method 
should be used in the valuation of helium. In part this paper is 
based on the author's testimony in that case. Specifically, this 
paper shows why an application of the workback method must be 
undertaken with an understanding of basic economic principles, 
particularly with respect to the choice of an appropriate starting 
point. We show how the Oklahoma district court incorrectly applied 
the workback method in 1 973, and the n changed its application in 
1978 to eliminate a fundamental economic error in its earlier 
ruling. 
3 
Although this paper specifically deals with helium, it 
is important to note that the general issues of valuation arise in 
connection with many natural resources. The principles enumerated 
in this analysis demonstrate certain conditions necessary for an 
appropriate application of the workback methodology. This is 
especially important where there are a number of processing stages 
that might serve as potential starting points. 
II. HELIUM AS A NATURAL RESOURCE 
Helium has several chemical and physical properties that 
make it important in certain scientific and industrial uses. It is 
light, inert, and liquifies at a very low temperature relative to 
most other elements. It is therefore useful in creating controlled 
atmospheres, for breathing mixtures, in welding, and in purging and 
pressurizing (e.g. , in space technology). It also is useful in 
cryogenics, primarily as a medium for preparing supercooled networks 
which have very low resistance to the flow of electric current. In 
that capacity helium may greatly facilitate the operation of large 
scale power generation systems. Helium also has many other uses, 
including nuclear power, detection of leaks (because of its small 
molecular diameter), and lifting. 
Helium is abundant in air, but only in concentrations of 
about five parts per million. It is possible to extract helium from 
the air at a cost of about $2500 per Mcf using existing technology 4 
4 
However, helium is also available in much higher 
concentrations from many natural gas fields. Much of it occurs in 
natural gas streams which are "rich" in helium (i. e. , helium 
constitutes more than 0.3 percent of the stream). Other large 
amounts of helium are found in less concentrated "lean" natural gas 
streams. 5 
The rapid depletion of natural gas reserves has posed an 
interesting problem in the ma nagement of helium resources over the last 
two decades. As a natural gas stream is recovered, transported, and 
consumed, any helium associated with that stream will be passed into 
the air at the burner tip if it is not extracted earlier. It is much 
more expensive to recover helium from the air than from a helium rich 
natural gas stream. (Using existing technology, it may take as 
much as eight hundred times as much energy to extract helium from 
the air as from a natural gas stream.)6 
Before 1960 the government extracted enough helium from 
natural gas streams for its own current use. However, no program 
for storing helium existed. By 1960 a number of new uses for helium 
led to a growing concern that the Bureau of Mines would not be able 
to produce enough helium from its own plants to meet the demand for 
helium after 1985. 
The Helium Conservation Program 
These concerns led to the passage of the Helium Act of 
1960, 7 which established a helium conservation program. Under this 
program the Bureau of Mines entered into contracts to purchase 
5 
helium from four private companies, called Helex companies. 8 The 
Helex companies were to extract helium from natural gas streams, and 
to sell the extracted helium mixture to the Bureau of Mines. The 
extracted helium mixture was termed "crude helium, " whose helium 
content was approximately fifty to seventy mole percent (see 
Table 1). 
The Bureau of Mines combined the crude helium it purchased 
with some of the helium it produced from its own plants, and injected 
the helium into a partially depleted natural gas field (the 
Cliffside field) near Amarillo, Texas. The Bureau planned to store 
enough helium so that, counting its own gas fields, over 4 0  billion 
cubic feet of "contained" helium would be available for future use. 
Contained helium refers to the amount of grade A helium (99.995 mole 
percent helium) that could in principle be extracted from the crude 
helium mixture. The stored helium was intended to meet the essential 
government needs for helium after 1985. As Table 1 shows, all of 
the Helex company plants were operating by 1963. 
By 1967 it was apparent that the actual demands for helium 
were falling well short of the amounts projected at the time the 
helium conservation program was established, and it was also apparent 
that this trend would continue. In addition, expectations developed 
for the discovery of substantial quantities of new reserves of 
helium. These were among the reasons cited by the Secretary of the 
Interior for terminating the helium purchase contracts in 1973.
9 
Thus, after 1973 the government ceased buying helium from the Helex 
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costs of the helium they acquired up to a wellhead price of about 
$3 per Mcf. The government agreed to bear any additional amounts 
that the Helex companies might have to pay for helium purchased at 
the wellhead from nonaf filiated producers as long as the payments 
were with the·"consent" of the government. Consent was defined to 
include third party claims judicially determined in favor of any 
claimant. Thus, both the government and the Helex companies have 
resisted the attempts of landowners and producers of helium-bearing 
natural gas streams to receive additional compensation for helium 
at the wellhead.11 
If the Oklahoma district court had decided that the markets 
for helium at the wellhead and at the inlets to the Helex plants 
were sufficiently competitive to use the transactions prices as a 
value for helium, then no workback calculations would have been 
necessary. Since it ruled otherwise, it found it necessary to 
employ the workback method. 
With this as background, we now describe the two markets 
for processed helium that the court examined as potential starting 
points for the workback method. These are the markets for crude 
helium and grade A helium. As we will show below, an understanding 
of the structure of these markets is essential to an economically 
sensible application of a workback method. 
III. THE MARKET FOR CRUDE HELIUM 
Data sunnnarizing the production of crude helium in the 
United States from 1960 to 1975 are shown in Table 2. Prior to 1960, 
9 
the Bureau of Mines produced all of the crude helium in this country, 
at the plants listed in Table 1. By 1963 all of the Helex company 
plants had begun production. From 1964 until 1973, when the conservation 
program was terminated, the Bureau of Mines produced no more than 20 
percent of the crude helium in any year. During the same interval the 
Helex company plants yielded between 8 0  and 8 5  percent of the total 
annual crude helium production. As Table 2 shows, between 1966 and 
1973 a small percentage of the crude helium was produced by private 
companies other than the Helex companies. 12 
By 1964 the conservation program was in full swing, and it 
continued that way until 1971, when the federal government made its 
first efforts toward terminating the program. From 1964 to 1970 
Northern was the smallest producer, with an annual production of between 
15. 3 and 18.1 percent of the total Helex company output. The largest 
producer among the helex companies was National, whose share of the 
total Helex company production annually was between 33. 3 and 37.1 
13 percent. 
Table 3 summarizes the purchases of crude helium from 1960 
to 1975. During the years of the conservation program, the Bureau of 
Mines purchased over 90 percent of the crude helium sold. The average 
price paid by the Bureau of Mines for crude helium sold by the Helex 
companies is shown in column four.14 The price received by any Helex 
company did not depart by more than $1.70 per Mcf from the price 
received by any other Helex company during the 1964 to 1970 period. 
Similar data for purchases of crude helium by private companies are 
also sunnnarized in Table 3. 
Calendar 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Bureau of Mines 
Mc fl 
642,000 
727,100 
680,867 
774,200 
784,500 
691, 700 
812, 400 
714,800 
677,700 
666,900 
660,100 
678,032 
438,665 
356,090 
338,076 
368,249 
% of Total 
100.0 
100.0 
99. 7 
35.6 
20.0 
16.5 
18.5 
16.5 
15.4 
15.3 
15.8 
18.0 
13.5 
12.8 
62.6 
53.5 
TABLE 2 
Crude Helium or Equivalent Production 
1960-1975 
Helex Cos, Mcf 
0 
0 
2,364 
1,398,295 
3,139,899 
3,494, 377 
3,560,892 
3,605,603 
3, 711, 789 
3,646,686 
3,464,028 
3,021,062 
2, 745,146 
2,352,893 
130,396 
256,071 
Private Parties 
% of Total 
0 
0 
0.3 
64.4 
80.0 
83.5 
81.2 
83.2 
84.3 
83.6 
82.6 
80.1 
84.3 
84.7 
24.2 
37 .2 
Other Mcf 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14,308 
ll,869 
14,319 
48,559 
67,476 
70, 963 
71,321 
69,802 
71,300 
64,095 
% of Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
1.1 
1.6 
1.9 
2.2 
2.5 
13.2 
9.3 
Total Mcf 
642,000 
727,100 
683,231 
2,172,495 
3,924,399 
4,186,077 
4,387 ,600 
4,332,272 
4,403,808 
4, 362,145 
4,191,604 
3, 770,057 
3,255,132 
2, 778, 785 
539,772 
688,415 
1) Grade "A" (Gaseous) Helium produced directly from helium bearing natural gas representing an equivalent 
or more amount of crude helium, and crude helium produced after June, 1965. 
�: Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum and U.S., Northern District of Oklahoma, No. 67-C-238 (1978), 
Phillips Exhibit 42 
calendar 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Mcf 
0 
0 
2,364 
1,398,295 
3,139,899 
3,494, 377 
3,560,892 
3,562,387 
3,583,283 
3,588,618 
3,431,382 
2,964,250 
2,687,148 
2,257 ,611 
0 
0 
Bureau of Mines 
% of Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
99.6 
98.5 
96.2 
97.1 
97.2 
95.9 
95.4 
93.2 
TABLE 3 
Crude Helium Purchases 
1960-1975 
Wtd. Ave. Price 
$/Mcf 
10.99 
11.65 
ll.26 
11.32 
11.44 
11.64 
11.83 
12.07 
12.41 
12.84 
13.26 
13.62 
Mcf 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14,308 
55,085 
142,825 
106,627 
100,122 
127' 775 
129,319 
165,084 
201,696 
320,166 
Private Purchases 
% of Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.4 
1.5 
3.8 
2.9 
2.8 
4.1 
4.6 
6.8 
100.0 
100.0 
Wtd. Ave. Price 
$/Mcf 
7.51 
11.55 
12. 70 
14.45 
16.05 
14.81 
ll.50 
10.47 
11.01 
10.25 
� : Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum and U.S., Northern District of Oklahoma, No. 67-C-238 (1978) 
Phillips Exhibit 43 
Total Mcf 
0 
0 
2,364 
l,398,295 
3,139,899 
3,494,377 
3,575,200 
3,617,472 
3, 726, 108 
3,695,245 
3,531,504 
3,092,025 
2,816,467 
2,422,695 
201,696 
320,166 
I-' 
0 
I-' 
I-' 
12 
IV. THE GRADE A HELIUM MARKET 
Prior to the start of the conservation program, the 
federal government sold grade A helium to both government agencies 
and private purchasers, in amounts indicated in Table 4. Although 
the table does not show the weighted average price for those 
transactions, most of those transactions occurred at a price of 
approximately $19 per Mcf. 15 
When the conservation program began, by federal statute 
the government charged a price for grade A helium which would cover 
the cost of purchasing crude helium, storing it, and converting it 
to grade A helium. It therefore established a price of $35 per Mcf 
for all grade A helium purchased from the Bureau of Mines. 
Government departments and agencies were required to purchase from 
the Bureau of Mines, even if lower costs supplies of helium were 
available from private sources. 
During the helium conservation program some private parties 
also sold grade A helium. Between 1962 and 1965, the only major 
private supplier was Kerr-McGee, which also set a price of $35 per 
Mcf. 
Beginning in 1966, other major private suppliers entered. 
Kansas Refined Helium undercut the Kerr-McGee price by a very large 
amount. While Kerr-McGee was still charging $35 per Mcf in 1966, 
Kansas Refined Helium sold grade A helium at a weighted average 
price of $16.37 per Mcf. Thus the weighted average price for both 
suppliers was $25.39 during 1966, as shown in Table 4. From 1968 
until 1972 there were four major suppliers of grade A helium, and 
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14 
the increased rivalry resulting from entry led to a decrease in the 
price of grade A helium to approximately $20 per Mcf. After 1969 the 
prices charged by all of the producers were within about three 
dollars of one another. In particular, Kerr-McGee sold grade A 
helium at an average price of approximately $19.00 to $19.50 from 
1970 to 1972.16 
V. APPLICATION OF THE WORJIBACK METHOD 
In 1973 the Oklahoma district court selected the market 
for grade A helium as the starting point for the workback method, 
and used a price of $20 per Mcf as the price at that starting point. 
In "working back" toward the wellhead, it first subtracted the 
costs of refining crude helium to obtain grade A helium; these 
costs were determined to be $2 per Mcf. Thus the value imputed to 
crude helium was $18 per Mcf of contained helium. 
The next stage in the workback method was to subtract 
from the value imputed to crude helium the costs incurred in 
extracting the crude helium mixture from the stream of natural gas. 
These cost determinations were quite complex, particularly since in 
the process of extracting crude helium, it was possible to obtain 
additional amounts of liquid hydrocarbons. There was a substantial 
debate as to whether the value of these "incremental liquids" should 
be viewed as a reduction in the extraction costs assigned to helium. 
The court in 1973 followed this practice, and subtracted from the 
total helium plant costs the value of the additional hydrocarbons 
15 
to obtain a net extraction cost for helium. Although the net cost 
for extracting helium varied from year to year, we note that on 
average the court determined this cost to be about $4 per Mcf for 
extraction.17 Thus the workback method yields a value of helium 
at the inlet to the Helex plant of approximately $14 per Mcf. 
Several particularly peculiar implications of the court's 
decision should be noted. The government had already paid, on 
average, about $12 per Mcf for crude helium (see Table 3). With 
the court decision, the government might have been liable for an 
additional $11 per Mcf for that same helium, since the Helex 
contracts would have made the government pay for all but $3 of the 
additional $14 per Mcf. Thus, the total payment of the government 
for crude helium would have been $23 per Mcf, more than the price 
paid for grade A helium. 
It is also interesting to note that, had the court started 
with the price of crude helium and worked back, then the value at 
the wellhead would have been about $8 per Mcf ($12 minus the $4 
average extraction cost). This is substantially less than the $14 
per Mcf resulting when the $20 price of grade A helium is used as a 
starting point. The importance of this difference is emphasized 
further since literally billions of cubic feet of helium are in 
. 18 question. 
Even a wellhead price of $8 per Mcf might seem excessive 
in light of the earlier described sales at $2 per Mcf prior to th e 
start of the conservation program. In fact, if the wellhead value 
of helium were actually $2 per Mcf, then producers and landowners 
16 
would be receiving a $6 per Mcf excess profit. In addition, if the 
Helex processing costs were $4 per Mcf, and if the government were 
ordered to pay the Helex companies for all helium purchase costs 
in excess of $3 per Mcf, then the Helex companies would also be 
realizing $5 per Mcf in excess profits ($12 - $4 - $3) on average. 
The 1978 Case 
In 1978 the Oklahoma district court retried the case 
on remand.19 It found that the appropriate starting point was the 
crude helium market instead of the grade A helium market, and used 
as a starting point the $10.30 per Mcf price specified in the Phillips 
contract (since the case involved Phillips specifically).20 It also 
increased its assessment of Phillips' processing costs to, on 
average, about $7.30 per Mcf, recognizing that it had understated 
the fair rate of return in its earlier ruling, and making other 
adjustments to its cost calculations. Thus, the court ruled that a 
fair wellhead value of helium, obtained by the workback method, was 
about $3 per Mcf, 21 instead of approximately $14 per Mcf as it had 
earlier found, and instead of $11.70 per Mcf that it would have 
calculated had it started with $20 per Mcf in the grade A helium 
market and subtracted $2 per Mcf in refining costs and the revised 
$7.30 in Helex processing costs. 
In this section we show that, given the choice between the 
crude and grade A helium markets as a starting point, the crude 
helium market is preferable on economic grounds. (This was the 
major thrust in the author's testimony in the 1978 retrial.) 
17 
At first examination, one might be tempted to assert that 
the discrepancy in the two workback method values ($3 compared with 
$11.70 per Mcf) arises because the helium markets are not perfectly 
competitive. It is true that a market with only four major sellers 
(as is the case in both the grade A and crude markets) is not 
typically characterized as perfectly competitive. 
Yet the issue of perfect or imperfect competition is not 
the central one in analyzing the court's decision. Rather, the 
central point is this: Even if all markets were perfectly 
competitive, an important source of error is introduced if one 
uses the grade A helium market price as the starting point in a 
workback method designed to determine the value of helium at the 
wellhead. 
To show this we observe (from the last columns of Tables 
2 and 4) that the volume of helium contained in the crude helium 
mixtures ranged from more than three times the volume of grade A 
helium in 1963 to more than eight times the volume of grade A helium 
produced in 1970 and 1971. Thus the volume of grade A helium is much 
less than the volume of helium processed at the Helex plants during 
every year of the conservation program. 
The error which arises is a clear example of a logical 
fallacy. It can be illustrated as follows. If we start with a 
$20 per Mcf figure for grade A helium, and subtract the $2 per Mcf 
cost of refining crude helium to grade A, then we impute a value 
of $18 per Mcf to all of the crude helium, based on the relatively 
small volume of grade A helium. This is logically equivalent to an 
18 
assumption that the much larger volume of crude helium could all be 
refined and sold as grade A at the price of $20 per Mcf, But that 
violates the economic Law of Demand, which predicts that the price 
of grade A helium would fall (rather than remain unchanged) if more 
crude were refined and sold as grade A helium. 
Although economic studies of the nature of the demand for 
grade A helium are sparse, there is at least some evidence that the 
d d . . 1 . 22 Th 11 . . eman is ine astic. us, even a sma percentage increase in 
the amount of crude helium which is refined and sold as grade A 
helium would lead to a much larger (at least three times larger) 
percentage decrease in the price of grade A helium. 
To illustrate this quantitatively, consider the year 1968. 
In that year about 3. 7 Bcf (billion cubic feet) of crude helium 
were produced (Table 3) and about 0. 7 Bcf of grade A helium was 
sold (Table 4), at a price of about $20 per Mcf. 
Suppose that the demand for grade A helium were of unitary 
elasticity, and that an additional 0. 1 Bcf of grade A helium were 
sold. Then the price in the grade A market would fall to $17. 50 per 
Mcf. If the demand were actually inelastic (instead of unitary 
elastic), then the price would even be lower than $17. 50 with the 
additional 0.1 Bcf of grade A helium in the market. 
The point here is that the additional 0.1 Bcf of grade A 
helium could be produced by using only an additional 2. 7 percent 
(O.l Bcf/3.7 Bcf) of the crude helium produced in that year. If 
larger amounts of crude were refined, the price of grade A would fall 
19 
by even more. Yet the 1973 court decision assumes that all of the 
crude helium could be refined and sold as grade A helium at a price 
of $20 per Mcf. The large difference in the volumes of helium 
in the crude and grade A markets therefore render the latter 
inappropriate as a starting point in the workback method. 23 
In its 1978 decision, the Oklahoma district court 
recognized these economic principles in changing its starting point 
for the workback method from the grade A helium market to the crude 
helium market. It noted that, 
If one fact has clearly emerged at retrial, it is the 
inappropriateness of using refined [grade A] helium 
prices as a starting value in extrapolating commingled 
helium's value at the wellhead • • •
Any suggestion that the helium in this case could 
have been refined and subsequently sold at then 
prevailing market prices of $20 to $35 per Mcf is at 
variance with what the most persuasive evidence 
demonstrates to be the truth 
It is now clear that it would be improper to 
attempt to value the 34 billion cubic feet of 
conservation curde [sic] helium in storage by any price 
the 3.3 billion cubic feet of refined helium [sold to 
private customers between 1962 and 1973] may have sold 
for. To do so would require the assumption that all 
of the 34 billion cubic feet of stored helium could have 
been refined and sold in the grade A market. It is 
clear that such could have not been done without 
drastically reducing the price of grade A helium.
24 
[brackets added, footnotes omitted] 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The valuation of an economic resource at a given stage 
20 
of production can pose an interesting economic problem, 
particularly if there is no market at that production stage. A 
workback methodology, properly applied, can be useful as a tool f or 
valuation. However, it should not be applied without an 
understanding of market structure, a principle correctly recognized 
by the Oklahoma district court at retrial. 
In developing a resource from a raw material into a 
finished product, each production stage will add 
economic value to what was initially only the value of 
the raw material. The value added at each stage of 
production is essentially the cost of resources used in 
taking the material through that stage of production. 
The work-back method essentially establishes at each 
production stage the value of the product at that 
point. By subtracting out all production costs, the 
value of the raw material is revealed. Application of 
this approach, however, can be difficult. Market structures 
vary at different production stages and correlating figures 
from one stage to the next can require abstruse 
analytical calculations, easily resulting in error. 
The selected starting point should be as close as 
possible to the production stage in question.
25 
[Emphasis added, footnotes omitted] 
21 
In this paper we have shown how large errors in valuation 
can result from an application of the workback method if the market 
structure is ignored, particularly if the starting point involves a 
much different volume than the quantity at the stage at which the 
resource is to be valuated. In fact, one federal district court 
made an error of this type in attempting to determine the wellhead 
value of helium in a 1 973 case, although on remand the same court 
corrected its error with explicit reference to the economic 
principles we have relied on in this analysis. 
We conclude by emphasizing that the workback methodology 
has much broader potential use than in helium, or even natural 
resources alone. Accordingly the principles we have demonstrated 
and illustrated have a broader application as well. This, more 
than the lesson about helium alone, should be viewed as the major 
contribution of this paper. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 393 F. Supp. 949, 992 
(D. Kan.). 
22 
2. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Company and United 
States of America, United States District Court N.D. Oklahoma 
No. 67-C-238, August 13, 1973 as corrected August 31, 1973. 
3. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Company and United 
States of America, United States Court of Appeals (tenth cir.), 
appealed from the United States District Court of Oklahoma 
(D.C. 67-C-238), May 10, 1977. 
4. Helium Study Committee (1978), p. 34. 
5. While helium is often found in conjunction with natural gas, it 
is not always so. For example, the very rich helium sources 
(about eight mole percent) produced by Kerr-McGee at Navajo, 
Arizona, were found in a gas stream which was predominantly 
nitrogen, rather than natural gas. 
6. Helium Study Committee (1978), p. 1. 
7. An Act to Amend the Helium Act of March 3, 1925, as amended, 
Public Law 86-777, 86th Congress, September 13, 1960. 
23 
8. The Helex companies were: Phillips Petroleum, Cities Service 
Helex, Northern Helex, and National Helium. 
9. See United States Department of Interior (1972). 
10. Northern Natural Gas Company v. Grounds, 393 F. Supp. 919 (1974) 
contains numerous references to contracts at about $2.00 per Mcf. 
11. In the 1978 retrial the Oklahoma district court found that: "A 
$2.00 per Mcf price for commingled helium was used by the 
Bureau of Mines in computing the price it was willing to pay 
under the helium conservation program. The four Helex companies 
in good faith believed they owned the helium contained in the 
natural gas and accepted $2.00 per Mcf as the value of the 
commingled helium." See Ashland v. Phillips (1978), n. 20 
infra, Judgment, Findings of Fact, para. 34. 
12. The private production of crude helium other than that of the 
Helex companies was primarily that of Helium, Inc. (sometimes 
called Kansas-Nebraska), and Alamo Chemical and Gardner Cryogenics. 
The latter was partially owned by Phillips, and sold its helium 
to Phillips at the relatively low price of about $7.50 per Mcf. 
Compare this price with the others shown in Table 3. 
13. Ashland Oil v. Phillips Petroleum and U.S., Northern District 
Court of Oklahoma, No. 67-C-238, Phillips Exhibit 44 (1978). 
24 
14. The price in each year has been calculated by multiplying the 
price paid to each Helex company times the fraction of the 
total volume of crude helium sold to the government by that 
company; these individual products are then summe d to obtain 
the weighted average price. 
15. As posted in the federal register, the price of grade A helium 
sold by the government to its own agencies was $15.50 per Mcf; 
government sales to private purchasers were at $19 per Mcf. 
16. Ashland v. Phillips (1978), n. 13 supra, Phillips Exhibit 51. 
17. The total helium plant costs for Phillips' Sherman Plant ranged 
from $3.53 to $5.52 per Mcf during the helium conservation 
program; the costs for Phillips' Dumas plant ranged from 
$5.91 to $6.55 per Mcf. The value of the incremental liquid 
hydrocarbons, to be subtracted from the above figures to obtain 
the net helium costs, were calculated on average to be about 
$1 per Mcf of 'extracted helium. Thus we arrive at the $4 per 
Mcf figure in the text. The correctness of the court's 
incremental liquid calculation is not treated in this paper, 
primarily because the magnitude of any error introduced there is 
of second order importance compared with the error arising from 
the court's use of an improper starting point. 
25 
18 . The anomaly is even more pronounced in th e 1978 rehearing of 
the Ashland case. Ashland argued that the appropriate starting 
point for each year should be the price of grade A helium, 
approximately as shown in the next to last column of Table 4. 
Thus, in 1963, for example, the workback method would be 
started at $35 per Mcf. If the total extraction and refining 
costs were $4 and $2 per Mcf respectively, the workback price 
at the Helex plant inlet would be $29 per Mcf, and the total 
government payment for crude helium would be about $38 per Mcf 
($29 - $3+ $12). 
19. Ashland v. Phillips (1978), see n. 13 supra. 
20. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Company and United 
States of America, Northern District Court of Oklahoma, No. 
67-C-238, Judgment filed December 28 , 1978 , findings of fact 
para. 22, 23. 
21. Ashland v. Phillips, n. 20 supra, conclusions of law para. 8 .
22. See Howland and Hulm (1974), section 4. 
23. This analysis was made in the author's testimony in Ashland v. 
Phillips, n. 13 supra, transcript pages 78 9-794. Also quoted 
in Ashland v. Phillips, n. 20 supra, Judgment, footnotes 4, 7, 
and 9. 
26 
24. Ashland v. Phillips, n. 20 supra, Judgment, pages 3, 4, and 19. 
25. Ibid., p. 3. See also the testimony of Professor Richard H. 
Leftwich, Ashland v. Phillips, n. 13 supra, transcript pages 368 -
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